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The present study reviews the foci, symbols and interpretations that the European media use to 
formulate and spread the political message about the “clash of civilizations”. This means observing 
how this cultural clash is articulated in political discourse and how this is then reflected in the leading 
European media. To carry out this study, we compared the frames found in several significant political 
discourses (Bush, Ahmadinejad, Sarkozy, Gül) and those encountered in the coverage of these same 
discourses in the following European newspapers: The Guardian, Le Monde, Frankfürter Allemaigne. 
Through this specific case, the research also explores what is the process of the frame elaboration and 
which conditions make political discourse more effective and attractive for the media to assimilate 
them. 
 
Key words: Framing, clash of civilizations debate, conflict coverage, political discourse, media discourse, 





To a great extent, cultural confrontation has replaced the 
ideological battles of the Cold War. During the 1990s, 
and particularly since 11 September 2001, Islamic radical 
groups have attacked the political and cultural control 
exercised by the West, engendering a climate of constant 
conflict which feeds on reasons that are both old and 
new: old bones of contention, like the conflict between 
Jews and Palestinians; and new ones, like those arising 
out of the “war on terror” or the so-called “cartoon crisis”. 
Although violent actions are mainly rejected by interna-
tional public opinion, there is no doubt that potential con-
frontations are brewing on the level of values and ways of 
understanding society. 
In Europe, the controversy emerges with specific 
issues, such us the debate on Turkey’s entry to the Euro-
pean Union or the public use of the veil in France. 
Samuel Huntington coined the term of “clash of civiliza-
tions” for this confrontation, emphasizing the most conflic-
tive aspect of the relationship between different cultures, 
which was to a great extent confirmed on 9-11. Although 
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the concept has flourished, and has come to be accepted 
as a recurring iconic expression in political and media 
discourse. The most interesting point in all of this is how it 
has been framed in the public arena. 
Political and media discourses are the main sources 
which feed and shape what goes on in the public sphere. 
Particularly in the global context, far from local realities, 
politicians and the media interact to compose a message 
which citizens are rarely able to influence. In this context, 
the media reinforce their function as intermediaries, 
spreading the declarations of political leaders for an 
audience who have no direct access to them. Alongside 
these political messages, they also transmit their own 
interpretation of events. 
The aim of the present study is precisely to review the 
foci, symbols and interpretations that the European me-
dia use to formulate and spread the political message 
about the “clash of civilizations”. This means observing 
how this cultural clash is articulated in political discourse 
and how this is then reflected in the most widely-used 
European media. Politicians have found on this rhetoric a 
resonant way to address some public issues, and the 
media an understandable approach to portray this conflict 
to the audience. This analysis will enable us to answer 
some key questions on the portrayal of the “clash of 





issues are seen in relation to it? What elements are pre-
sent in the way this idea is expressed? 
Through this specific case, the research also intends to 
make a contribution to the theoretical discussion on the 
frame analysis. In this sense, it explores what is the pro-
cess of the frame elaboration and which conditions make 
political discourse more effective and attractive for the 
media to assimilate them. 
To carry out this study, we compared the frames found 
in several significant political discourses (Bush, Ahmadi-
nejad, Sarkozy, Gül) and those encountered in the cove-
rage of these same discourses in the leading European 
media (The Guardian, Le Monde, Frankfürter Allemaigne) 
to determine dynamics which affect the final content that 
reaches the audience. 
 
 
Framing as a theory for the analysis of media 
interpretation 
 
Of all the possible theories of mediation (which explain 
how the media represent and reconstruct reality), framing 
is particularly useful if we want to find out the vision that 
the media have of events and the interpretation which 
they convey to the audience. In contrast to agenda-
setting or priming, which stress the effects of the news on 
public opinion, the theory of framing also takes in the 
previous stage, analyzing the factors that have an effect 
on the way the news is written (choice of sources, cultural 
references, influence of external agents, professional rou-
tines). 
Following the tradition of social constructivism 
(McQuail, 2005; D’Angelo, 2002), framing studies the 
focus or frames through which social agents and interest 
groups (sources and broadcasting companies), journa-
lists (mediators) and the audience (receivers) assimilate, 
interpret and communicate the reality around them. In 
short, framing is the process through which the media 
interpret real phenomena and transmit them to an au-
dience with a particular focus. 
This media effect acts on two different levels: it shapes 
the way that public affairs are presented, and it also 
molds the knowledge of each of the individuals who is 
exposed to its influence. In this study we are concerned 
mainly with its ability to moderate public debates on poli-
tical affairs (Weaver & Wilhoit, 1986; Schudson, 1983). 
For this purpose, we understand journalists as process-
sors of the information that comes from the sources 
(international political leaders), and that they interpret the 
ideas in the leaders’ declarations, writing and broadcast-
ing products  that are different from the source content 
(while undoubtedly influenced by them) (Gamson and 
Mogdiliani, 1987, 1989). 
Following the classification that D’Angelo proposed for 
the four empirical objectives that should guide framing 
research in the media (identifying thematic units, re-
searching the conditions in which they are produced, exa-
mining how they are activated and  how  they  interact  as 




individual frames, and how they shape public opinion and 
debate), the present paper seeks to carry out the first two 
of these: to identify issues related to the “clash of 
civilizations” present in the media, and to study to what 
extent they reflect the international political discourse 
(D’Angelo, 2002). This research is therefore situated in 
the field of media framing and not that of audience 
framing (Capella and Jamielson, 1997; Scheufele, 1999). 
 
 
Frame elaboration process 
 
There are different concepts of frames and, as a result, 
different explanations on how they shape the reality. In 
the views of Tuchman (1978) and Tankard (1991), the 
frame is the result of certain professional routines or stra-
tegies which enable us to “delimit” reality: this is the view 
of the professional from the “window” through which he 
sees the world (frame takes a “space dimension”). The 
frame of this window is defined by journalists’ re-sources, 
by the different ways of organizing information within a 
particular medium, or by the formats used to cover similar 
events (Hans-Bernd and Peter, 1995). Other authors, like 
Gamson (1992), consider that the frame acts as a map or 
guidebook offering key informa-tion that helps us know, 
understand and analyze a given public matter. A third 
definition of frame identifies it with an interpretation of 
reality which is not confined to stress-ing certain issues, 
but which also argues and interprets the facts in a new 
context, or by establishing a new rela-tionship with a pre-
vious fact (Cohen and Wolfsfeld, 1993). This interpret-
tation is ontologically different from the subject of the 
piece of news or information in itself (Pan and Kosicky, 
1993). 
Most of the authors admit that the frames or foci used 
in the media are the consequence of the interaction of dif-
ferent factors. Gamson (1992), and Cohen and Wolfsfeld 
(1993) assert that the frames also depend on elements 
that are external to the medium, like the views of the 
broadcasting company, the attitude of the person re-
ceiving the message, and the cultural context in which 
the message is devised and broadcast. 
In the view of Entman (1993, 2007), the frame is the 
result of elements in the contents that stand out among 
the others (words, ideas, relations) as the result of a pro-
cess of selection, emphasis and exclusion of some types 
of information. The visibility of these elements enables us 
to construct a specific interpretation of the matter. Ent-
man asserts that these outstanding or noteworthy fea-
tures establish a definition of the problem, determine the 
reasons that lie behind it, its consequences, and guide 
the measures that are used to resolve it (2007). This way 
of distinguishing frames is particularly useful to identify 
the strategies of the political elites in their relations with 
the media. These frames are established in response to 
fixed, short-term interests, and are the result of a political 
initiative or the work of a pressure group. Other authors 
consider that the focus or  interpretation  in  the  frame  is  




derived from a central organizing idea which is shared 
socially, and which works symbolically to structure and 
give meaning to a given issue (Reese, 2001, 2007). It is 
understood as a process in constant activity, which 
relates ideas with each other and includes or excludes 
different interpretations as time goes by (Reese, 2007). 
This way of describing the generation of the frame is 
more useful for analyzing the dynamics of public debates 
on issues over time, and makes it easier to follow the 
development of political discourses and their presence in 
the media. 
The hypothesis of the study is that frames are the result 
of both kinds of process. In part, there is a process 
involving the selection and visibility of certain concepts or 
words, and these are partly the result of interpretations 
devised from central ideas which develop over time, and 
which are the product of the way various factors interact. 
 
 
Interaction between ‘source frame’ and ‘media 
frame’: efficacy conditions 
 
Scheufele’s (1999) vision of framing as a continuous 
feedback process describes precisely, in our view, the 
dynamics that operates between politicians and the 
media in the international arena. Of the different phases 
which are part of this process, our study focuses on the 
first, that is, the moment in which the frame is constructed 
(frame building) which takes in the factors that contribute 
to forming the professional view of matters, paying spe-
cial attention to external agents (see also Gans, 1979). 
Regarding the typology that is established, we propose 
completing the classification proposed by Scheufele 
(1999) adding a new type of frame. Scheufele identifies 
those frames created by the media (media frame) and 
those applied by the audience (audience or individual 
frame): we will also take those used by social agents 
acting as sources of information (source frame). 
As has been stated, the interest of the present study 
lies chiefly in the relationship that is established between 
the source frame and the media frame (Neuman et al., 
1992). Specifically, the aim is to explore which conditions 
make source frame more effective: what are the sit-
uations and circumstances which make it easier for the 
media to assimilate them. 
The first of these criteria is that the subject should be a 
new social phenomenon. As Beck states, on some occa-
sions, reality goes beyond the established social con-
cepts, which are suddenly outdated and incapable of ex-
plainning a new turn of affairs (Beck, 2003). In this situa-
tion, the media acquire the power to make meanings, 
because they name these new phenomena before others 
can, and coin expressions and terms which are taken up 
by the public at large, since they need to communicate 
and dialogue about these realities. According to Rojecky, 
when people experience some of the unexpected cones-
quences of globalization in their own lives, they look to 





understand their surroundings and act accordingly 
(Rojecky, 2005; Giddens, 1990). 
A second condition that makes the media more effect-
tive is the outbreak of a crisis, or at least of situations that 
give people the impression that there is a crisis. It has 
been proven that in such circumstances, people’s confi-
dence in media discourse, and in the interpretations that 
take hold of public opinion, is greater than people’s confi-
dence in their own knowledge or opinions (Lang & Lang, 
1981). 
Finally, the media frame or interpretation is more rea-
dily accepted when it is transmitted through expressions, 
metaphors, values and ideas that have cultural reso-
nance. “Cultural resonance” is an area of significance 
that is shared between politicians, the media and the 
audience, which stimulates ideas, principles and values 
belonging to the cultural context, communicating much 
more than the literal meaning of the text (La Porte, 2008). 
Cultural resonance does not interpret or frame a given 
issue in the same way as the frame itself does. It is a 
reference to the culture itself, or the system of principles, 
which makes the frame easier to understand and more 
likely to succeed. As Gamson (1988) states, resonances 
which evoke a cultural context make the frame more 
effective. The allusion to cultural values that define the 
identity of a society, and which are generally shared, 
helps the audience to understand and remember the 
interpretation of reality that is projected by the media. 
Cultural resonance can be understood as a reaction of 
empathy on the part of the audience when they recognize 
that the message contains an element from their cultural 
tradition (Schudson, 1989). It can also be viewed as an 
element of the text itself (“condensed symbols”, in the 
words of Sapir, 1934 and Edelman, 1964), which evokes 
images or memories that form part of the audience’s 
cultural identity. The study we present here takes the 
second of these definitions, and in the content analysis 
we have tried to identify the expressions or symbols 
which might possess cultural resonance of this kind. 
We chose the debate on the “clash of civilizations” as 
the subject of this study because of our interest in ex-
ploring the coverage of an issue which, at least hypo-
thetically, fulfils the conditions for effectiveness: it is a 
new social phenomenon, it is perceived as a dangerous 
threat, and it is presented by expressions and ideas with 





To carry out this study, we compared the frames or specific inter-
pretations found in several significant political discourses and those 
encountered in the coverage of these same discourses in the 
international media. 
In the choice of politicians to form part of the sample, we followed 
the criterion of relevance in the “clash of civilizations” debate. We 
thus analyzed some speeches by George W. Bush and Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad, insofar as they represent the two extremes of the 
controversy between the western and Islamic worlds. In order to 





included two more representatives: the President of Turkey, 
Abdulah Gül, and French president Nicolas Sarkozy. Abulah Gül 
stands out because of his support, alongside Spain, for an “Alliance 
of Civilizations”, as a possible solution to the conflict of the “clash of 
civilizations”, while Nicolas Sarkozy is notable for his views on 
“positive laicism” as a solution to the problems of religious coexis-
tence which France is experiencing within its own borders. 
As far as the specific discourses of each leader are concerned, 
two selection criteria were applied: the interest which they aroused 
in the international audience, and the extent to which they reflected 
the problem of the “clash of civilizations”. 
In the case of George W. Bush, we chose four States of the 
Nation speeches, which take in the period from just after 9 - 11 to 
the present day: those of 2002, 2004, 2006 and 2008. The two year 
lapses between speeches allow us to observe the development in 
his interpretation of the “clash of civilizations”. 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s declarations in October 2005, made 
during his “The World without Zionism” conference in Teheran, had 
great resonance because of the attacks he made on Israel. Also 
considered to be of relevance were his appearances in September 
2007 at the University of Columbia and before the General Assem-
bly of the United Nations, in which he again attacked the United 
States and Israel. Lastly, we included an analysis of a speech made 
in May 2008 in which he explicitly threatened the United States. 
To assess the figure of Abulah Gül, we have selected some 
speeches delivered from the beginning of our period of research 
(2001), although he was not yet President of Tukey. As it is known, 
Gül was Prime Minister from 2002 to 2003, and Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs from 2003 to 2007. In 2007, he was elected President of the 
country. Analized speeches have been delivered in 2004, to the 
Islamic Conference Organization gathered in Istambul to discuss on 
“Civilization and Harmony: values and mechanisms of the Global 
Order”; and the one given in 2006, before the General Assambly of 
the United Nations, in New York. For the media analysis, and, as 
none of the discourses chosen were reflected, we decided to look 
at any of his words related to the topic of the study quoted in the 
European media from September 11th. 
Sarkozy’s references to French laicism and the need to include 
morality in politics were already present during his election 
campaign speeches. We therefore complement our sample of 
Sarkozy’s speeches as French president with his declarations as 
candidate to the presidency made in Bercy less than one month 
before he took office (29/04/2007). We also include his famous 
speech to the European Parliament (13/11/2007), in which he 
speaks of “spiritual politics” and “lay morality”, and his declarations 
in the Roman basilica of St John Lateran (20/12/2007), in which he 
coined the term “positive laicism”. 
Regarding our sample from the European media, we selected 
those which can be considered to be leading newspapers in their 
country and have also an international prestige: Le Monde 
(France); The Guardian (United Kingdom); Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung (Alemania). The dates of publication were always either the 
day of the speech or the two or three following days, depending on 
the extent to which the story was covered. 
In accord with the theoretical framework described above, the 
content analysis was performed paying particular attention to: 
quotations relevant to the “clash of civilizations”; the main object of 
the quotation (denunciation, threat, reinforcement of a political argu- 
ment); identification of key words, authoritative arguments (of a 
religious, political or cultural nature), authoritative sources (reli-
gious, political), historical or cultural references and use of signify-
cant narrative resources (metaphors, examples and expressions). 
Those categories allow identifying elements which have contributed 
to build the frame and to determine which of the two theses 
mentioned above seems more possible. 
Examination of the influence which external actors (speeches by 
political and religious leaders) have on the creation or modification 
of journalists’ frames turns the media themselves into  a  dependent  




variable (Scheufele, 1999). As the object of this study was to 
identify the presence of the leaders’ frames in the media, and to 
observe the way that the media frame the issue (Price, Tewksbury 
and Powers 1995, 1996), the analysis concludes with a comparison 
between the two types of content, which make it possible to 
evaluate the conditions in which the frames used by the sources 
tend to prosper, and are conveyed to an European audience.  
 
 
Analysis of the political speeches 
 
In what follows, we report only the conclusions that are 
most relevant to the aims of this study.  
 
George W. Bush: Over the six-year period of the study, 
we can observe a modification in the emphasis of the 
speeches from the rhetoric of war to a more pacifistic 
focus in which values are upheld. However, there is also 
a set of ideas that are repeated throughout the speeches, 
which help us to identify a framework which imposes a 
specific interpretation. 
First, Bush’s speeches reflect a rejection of the idea of 
a “clash of civilizations” understood as a conflict between 
values or as the imposition of one set of principles on 
another. In this context, there are two frames or interpret-
tations which are constantly repeated in his words: firstly, 
the “war” is a “war on terror”, and therefore against terro-
rists, rather than against the Muslim world, and secondly, 
the USA does not want to impose its culture, but rather to 
defend the universal value of freedom and democracy. In 
accord with this approach, he often puts up a defense 
against accusations of imperialism that have been le-
veled from various quarters, mainly from within the Mus-
lim world: “We have no intention of imposing our culture” 
(2002). This same focus is observed in the declarations 
which he makes directly to the Islamic population: “We 
respect your right to choose your own future and win your 
own freedom” (2006). In another allusion to the people of 
Iran, he repeats: “Our message to the people of Iran is 
clear: We have no quarrel with you” (2008). 
A second frame that is easy to detect is his moral ana-
lysis of the situation. This is not a “clash of civilizations”, 
but it is a “clash bet-ween good and evil”. From this moral 
rather than political viewpoint, he tries to find a basis for 
his condemnation of the Islamists’ deeds, and the actions 
of their supporters. The well-known expressions such as 
“enemies of freedom”, “axis of evil” and “evil empire” 
simply encapsulate this particular approach. 
In connection with this vision of the moral need to 
struggle against evil, other frames can be identified which 
can be distin-guished from each other in terms of the 
audience to which he is speaking at particular times. It is 
well known that the State of the Nation speeches, though 
primarily aimed at the American popu-lation, are widely 
reported abroad, and the President is evidently address-
ing both audiences at different times. 
Speaking to American citizens, his moral frame takes 
on a directly religious form. His eloquence has religious 
overtones, as he tells us  that  “Even  in  tragedy,  God  is  




near”, and refers to this “Time of testing” or “Time of 
adversity”. 
Addressing both the US and the international audience, 
the President draws on explanations that justify his 
foreign policy, with a twofold aim: to explain the effort 
which he is asking of the American people, and to con-
vince his potential allies of the nobility of his venture. 
Along these lines, he stresses his denunciation of the 
terrorists’ acts which “sow terror, coerce liberty and sub-
ject the people” in its immediate and indirect cones-
quences, which are perverse for their own people as well 
as for the West. Secondly, he emphasizes that the aim of 
American politics is not to defend the USA’s own 
interests, but to safeguard basic, universal human rights 
such as freedom, democracy and economic develop-
ment. Thus, for example, in 2006 he state: “The only way 
to defeat the terrorists is to defeat their dark vision of 
hatred and fear by offering the hopeful alternative of 
political freedom and peaceful change”. He also quite 
frequently refers to this battle using nominal forms, such 
as “free-dom´s fight” or “freedom´s power”. 
Alongside these arguments, Bush defends the need for 
American leadership to respond to the call of history. This 
focus coincides with another characteristic trait in Ameri-
can political culture, which has been a constant since the 
times of the Founding Fathers: the duty to respond to a 
historic destiny by defending and extending democratic 
principles to all nations (ideas that are set out in the 
Declaration of Independence). His speeches therefore 
contain expressions that have a significant cultural reso-
nance for the Ame-rican population: “history has called 
America”, “historic goal”, “tasks of history”. 
To summarize, we can state that Bush’s speeches can 
be seen to include several frames or interpretations. He 
does not take the position that there is a “clash of 
civilizations”, replacing this notion with that of the “war on 
terror” aimed at the terrorists alone. Along the same lines, 
he stresses that the actions of the USA are not intended 
to impose a specific culture, but rather to defend the 
universal value of freedom. Secondly, in connection with 
the earlier interpretation, the struggle that the USA is 
envisaging is moral rather than cultural: the confrontation 
is between “good and evil”. This moral analysis takes on 
a religious frame when it is directed at a national au-
dience. Finally, we may note a vision of American leader-
ship as obliged to respond to the “call of history” to fulfill 
its mission to defend and spread democratic principles to 
all nations.  
 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad: The President of Iran, Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad, is well known for his controversial com-
ments openly criticizing the United States and Israel. In 
the context of the “clash of civilizations”, he might in 
some way be considered to be George W. Bush’s anta-
gonist. In Ahmadinejad’s speeches, we can observe four 
main frames of interpretation.  
 First, we can detect the coexistence of a cultural vision 





world, expressed in a general and somewhat vague way, 
with a political vision that is very forcefully manifested. 
This cultural view is noticeable in the Iranian Presi-
dent’s proposal for solving the conflict arising from the 
“clash of civilizations”: a “Coalition for Peace”, which he 
himself defines as a “fraternal front (...) based on mono-
theism and justice (...) to prevent incursions and arro-
gance, and to spread the culture of cordiality and justice.” 
This “fraternity” is understood mainly to group together 
the Islamic nations. 
In the political aspect of his view, the confrontation is 
with particular countries, that is, the USA and Israel. 
Although these could also be representatives of two 
cultures, the reason given for antagonism is that they 
hold political aims that are opposed to Iran and other Isla-
mic governments. US imperialism is to blame for the 
problems of the Middle East, because the USA is trying 
to prevent the development of these peoples in order to 
maintain its world hegemony. He accuses the USA of 
putting pressure on other powers (Europe) to follow in its 
footsteps. In his address to the United Nations, he com-
pares the position of “certain great powers” with “the 
condescending attitude (...) of the feudal lords towards 
the peasants in the Middle Ages”. Ahmadinejad rejects 
the concept of a “religious war”, replacing it with “Bush´s 
expansionism”. Moreover, he uses highly significant 
expressions to refer to the USA: “Oppressor World”, “Glo-
bal Arrogance”, “World Arrogance”, “Global dominant 
system” and “Bullying powers”. 
The image of Israel is as a “bridgehead” created by the 
USA to extend its dominion over the Muslim world in a 
way that is far from legitimate. The “Islamic nation” must 
unite against this “conspiracy”. In his 2005 speech, the 
Iranian President makes his position very clear: “Israel 
should be wiped off the map”, “I warn all the leaders in 
the Islamic world to beware of this conspiracy. If any of 
them takes a step towards the recognition of this regime, 
then  he  will  burn  in the fire of the Islamic Umma (...)”. 
The third and fourth frame identified in this analysis 
brings to light an interesting parallelism with the frames 
used in Bush’s speeches. In concrete, in his use of the 
religious frame and his way of understanding the role that 
destiny (or history) has assigned to him in person, and to 
his country. 
For the President of Iran, references to God and the 
Islamic faith are always present when it comes to taking 
decisions and making judgments. Justice belongs to God. 
This is reflected, for example, in the declarations he 
made in 2008 in reference to the USA: “You can be sure 
that the hand of God and the wrath of the peoples will 
grab you by the throat”. The oppressor powers form an 
“Infidel front” which the Islamic Umma must defeat, with 
God’s aid. 
Ahmadinejad again shows parallels with Bush when he 
draws on history to explain his ideas. In his view, the Isla-
mic Umma is going through an “era of darkness” which “will 
come to an end”. “The cus-toms and traditions based on 





it has to fight against a “historical enemy”, namely Israel. 
The conflict with the USA and Israel is a “battle of des-
tiny”. 
We may thus conclude that Ahmadinejad’s discourse 
can be seen to contain four frames of interpretation 
regarding the “clash of civilizations”. First, an ill-defined 
cultural vision coexists with a more political interpretation 
of the conflict between cultures. The second frame, which 
is more explicit, sees that USA as preventing the deve-
lopment of the Middle East in order to maintain its own 
world hegemony. Third, he draws on a religious argument 
to justify the duty to intervene, situating this within the 
framework of the Holy War and reproducing the most 
literal meaning of the “clash of civilizations”. The fourth 
frame is a continuation of this, expressing the historical 
significance of his mission.  
 
Abdulah Gül: The Turkish President, Abdullah Gül, con-
centrated his labors on promoting diplomatic relations 
between Turkey and the rest of the world, particularly 
within the “Alliance of Civilizations” project proposed as 
an alternative to the “culture clash”. 
At this point, it is significant to note that the terminology 
he uses to describe the potential conflict that we are 
discussing makes no reference to culture or religion, but 
only to geography, which tends to emphasize a neutral or 
anodyne stance: he never talks about the Islamic world, 
for example, but only about East and West. 
The use of these terms is consistent with his discourse, 
which is openly on the side of genuine dialogue between 
cultures: in fact, the word “dialogue” appears with striking 
frequency in his decal-rations: “The high quality and 
candidness of the discussions were very much fitting to 
the atmosphere of dialogue we want to advance among 
different cultures. It was genuine, focused and in a sense 
operational, with a clear eye on the future of our dialogue. 
It is important that we do not only talk of dialogue, but 
also engage in the real thing, because genuine dialogue 
is the only insurance for our common future”. 
His words demonstrate his conviction that it is possible 
for different cultures and religions to live side by side, and 
reinforce his main idea by recalling historical 
experiences: “This has been the case at certain glorious 
periods of the Andaluz, Roman or Ottoman Empires, as 
well as in many other eras”. He is a clear proponent of 
pluralism, and he understands that cultural diversity is 
compatible with the existence of universal human values 
which will enable us to build a shared world society. 
Following these principles, he focuses the main part of 
the debate on the defence and improvement of human 
rights, thus avoiding confrontation about values or beliefs: 
“This challenge is not about our religion. It is about 
strengthening our societies and providing for our citizens 
the highest possible standards in political, economic and 
social life”. In this context, he has no qualms about warn-
ing Islamic nations about the need to consolidate demo-
cracy, eliminate corruption and guarantee the defence of 
human rights, ideals that do not  belong  only  to  western 




culture: “We are fortunate, because the Islamic faith 
lends itself to a rational and humanistic understanding of 
the world”. 
His vision is thus consistent with that expressed by his 
Foreign Minister, Ali Babacan, who interprets the “clash 
of civilizations” as caused by a lack of communication 
between the western and Muslim world, which has led to 
“Islamophobia” in western countries. To overcome this 
rejection and restore a more accurate view of Islam, Ali 
Babacan makes a clear distinction between Islam and the 
“holy war” fomented by terrorists: “Islam is the religion of 
peace. Peace is the object of Islam and the purpose of 
Muslims”. 
To encourage communication between East (Islamic 
world) and West, he backs the Alliance of Civilizations 
initiative, which is not just a political project but an inter-
pretation as to how to approach and resolve the clash of 
civilizations: “We must promote a kind of mutual under-
standing and tolerance that will enable us to counter and 
reverse a growing trend to racist, xenophobic and discri-
minatory discourse”. The aim of the Alliance of Civili-
zations coincides with the frame that this politician tries to 
promote: international cooperation to combat extremism 
in many countries, break down social and cultural barriers 
between the west and the Islamic world, and reduce the 
tensions between societies with different religious and 
social values. 
We could therefore conclude that Abdullah Gül is trying 
to mini-mize the confrontation between cultures, avoiding 
references to differences in values or beliefs, and cen-
tring the debate on the need to guarantee human rights 
as universal rights; secondly, he thinks that the best way 
to resolve potential confrontation is by genuine dialogue 
which respects the identity of each culture; and thirdly, he 
points to the framework of the Alliance of Civilizations as 
being the most appropriate way of achieving peaceful 
and tolerant coexistence.  
 
Nicolas Sarkozy: Nicolas Sarkozy’s references to French 
laicism and the need for morality to be part of politics 
appear as early as his election campaign speeches. 
Regarding the interpretative frame of the clash of 
civilizations, the French President can be said to identify 
religion as a cause of conflict, and to propose a solution 
to this by creating a “civil religion” characterized by 
“spiritual politics” and “lay morality” which take politics, 
freedom and democracy as their cornerstone. 
Secondly, in close harmony with the first interpretation 
of the “clash of civilizations”, we can identify the idea of 
“positive laicism”. This term was coined by Sarkozy in his 
speech at the basilica of St. John Lateran, in Rome, and 
has taken on resonance all over the world because of the 
implicit meaning that it contains. As Sarkozy himself ex-
plained, “positive laicism” is an approach which “always 
concerned with the freedom to think, to believe or not 
believe, does not see religions as a danger, but as a 
value”(...) “The aim is to seek dialogue with the great reli-
gions of France, and to obey the principle  of  making  the  




everyday life of the great spiritual movements easier, 
instead of more complicated”. 
Finally, we can deduce that, as far as the culture clash 
goes, Sarkozy interprets the construction of Europe as 
something that has to be reinforced and promoted, as a 
“great ideal”. He credits the idea of “European identity” 
with great importance: Europe is made up of a set of 
peoples with common values who form a civilization. In 
his speech to the European parliament, he expressed  
his ideas thus: The construction of Europe is the expres-
sion of the common will of the peoples of Europe, who 
recognize common values, acknowledge a common civili-
zation, and want those values and that civilization to stay 
alive.” 
From our study of Sarkozy’s speeches, we can deduce 
that he establishes various frames of interpretation for 
analysis of the international political situation and the 
clash of cultures. His main idea is that it is important to 
defend a “civil religion” characterized by “spiritual politics” 
and “lay morality”. Thus although he removes religion 
from the public sphere, he does not obliterate it, but 
advocates “positive laicism” characterized by religious 
freedom and dialogue between different beliefs. Finally, 
we may note his idea of Europe as a civilization that 
shares a set of values and an identity of its own that must 
be strengthened.  
 
 
Analysis of the media presence of these speeches 
 
Now that we have established the interpretative frames 
for the “clash of civilizations” that these politicians use in 
their speeches, the next step is to see how these frames 
are reflected or ignored by the media, and what new 
approaches the media create through their reports.   
 
 
The Guardian and its rejection of the “clash of civili-
zations” 
 
First, it must be pointed out that The Guardian under-
stands the world order as a multipolar system. In the 
different analyses pub-lished around the dates of the 
speeches analysed above, it does not hesitate to empha-
size the multiplicity of centres osf power that condition 
and determine what happens in the international com-
munity (Jonathan Steel, 3 February 2006, “Bush just has 
to face it: he is wrong and Chirac is right: The crisis over 
Hamas and Iran underline the collapse of the neocon 
mission and the end of a one-superpower world”). From 
this viewpoint, it would seem obvious that the editorial 
line will determine a marked scepticism when it comes to 
admitting the existence of a possible “clash of civiliza-
tions”. 
The Guardian accepts Presidente Bush’s rejection of 
the exis-tence of a “clash of civilizations” as a conflict 
between cultures. However, it openly criticizes Bush’s 
moral vision of the “war on terror”, and stresses the pure-





an “organizing principles of the White House agenda”, 
which has concrete aims that are even defined in terms 
of limited time periods: according to The Guardian, the 
“war on terror” which began on 11 September ended on 
20 January 2004 when the American administration was 
forced to turn its attention to the economy, without having 
conquered its declared enemies. 
The newspaper pays special attention to the expres-
sion “axis of evil”. It denounces the way that Al Qaeda 
comes to be substituted by the group of nations which the 
USA regards as enemies, as a further proof of Bush’s 
political intentions, and asserts that the the rhetoric used 
alongside this doctrine is nothing more than an alarmist 
strategy to justify the invasion of Iraq. Although it does 
give the President’s statements concerning America’s 
mission in history and its leadership in the quest for world 
peace, it reinterprets these words in a more pragmatic 
sense, demanding that Bush should seek a prompt, defi-
nitive solution to the Iraq problem. 
In the case of Ahmadinejad, too, The Guardian consids 
that the rhetoric of the clash of civilizations responds to 
political intentions: it brings out the point that the coalition 
which Ahmadinejad tries to create through his contacts 
with Russia, China or Venezuela does not reflect a cultu-
ral criterion, but rather an anti-American one. On similar 
lines, the newspaper considers that his denial of the 
Holocaust is motivated by internal political issues, and 
that his main aim is to consolidate his own power in the 
face of internal dissidence. 
We may therefore conclude that The Guardian does 
not accept the dualist view of the “clash of civilizations”, 
but accepts that this logic colours the political discourse 
of Bush and of Islamic funda-mentalism, even though the 
reasons for this on both sides are political rather than 
cultural (Timothy Garton Ash, 22 January 2004, “Next 
stop Syria: Washington’s post 9-11 war on terror is 
finished. But another has only just begun”). 
The Guardian takes a different stance when it covers 
the speeches by Sarkozy and Abdullah Gül. Out of all the 
possible issues, here it emphasizes the controversy on 
Turkey’s admission to the European Union. Without 
modifying its scepticism concerning the so-called “clash”, 
and in order to defend Turkey’s candidature, it does not 
hesitate to use not only the elements that belong within 
the framework of the “clash of civilizations”, but even the 
term itself: “Turkey and France are seen, from Paris at 
least, as irreconciliable opposites, embodiments of the 
‘clash of civilizations’. Except, of course, they are not” 
(Fiachra Gibbons, 13 October 2006, “This ignorant act 
will only fan the flames of division: The French vote to 
outlaw denial of the Armenian genocide plays into the 
hands of Islamist nationalists in Turkey”, Guardian com-
ment and debate pages).  The Guardian warns of the 
possible risks of rejecting the Turkish proposal, and it is 
understood that if this happens, the confrontation will 
have cultural overtones. However, it also eludes the frame of 
reference being analysed here, using various diffrerent 





civilizations”; if the EU promise is broken, this would send 
Turkey a signal that there are “deep divisions between 
East and West”; and finally, it attributes the interpretation 
of this clash to a particular position held by Sarkozy, 
which is not even shared by his immediate colleagues 
(Philippe Marliere, 24 abril 2007, Comment is free: Do not 
be fooled by Sarkozy: France's soul is still leftwing: “The 
socialists' blunders have placed a brutal neoliberal on the 
verge of power – but it is not too late to stop him”, Guar-
dian comment and debate pages). 
The Turkish position is reflected through Erdogan’s 
decalrations: Abdullah Gül is scarcely quoted. In Erdo-
gan’s words, the refe-rences to the “clash of civilizations” 
appear with great frequency, as a danger which would 
Europe would be provoking if it failed to accept Turkey in 
its midst. In this case, The Guardian joins in the rhetoric 
by considering this possibility, but always in a purely figu-
rative context. The newspaper’s arguments are under-
pinned by its multipolar view: Turkey’s entry would enable 
us to create a powerful European Union capable of con-
fronting other emerging powers, such as China or India. 
In conclusion, we can state that the editorial line of this 
news-paper prevails over the political discourses. The 
Guardian still uses the rhetoric and foci proper to the 
“clash of civilizations”, but does so as a frame of refe-
rence used by others, with intentions other than what 
might properly be termed cultural conflict. Our analysis 
brings to light two different contexts. 
The first context, which could be regarded as global, is 
deter-mined by the speeches of Bush and Ahmadinejad. 
In this case, though the “clash of civilizations” is not 
mentioned directly, other expressions associated with this 
schema are used, such as “axis of evil” or “war on terror” 
in the case of Bush, or “Great Satan” and “global 
arrogance” in Ahmadinejad’s case. But in this context, the 
“clash” is a clash not of civilizations but of political inte-
rests. 
The second context is a European one. Here, a conflict 
of a cultural nature is mentioned explicitly, but the news-
paper’s pragmatic approach prevents this from being 
seen as a real threat: it is just another useful argument to 
defend Turkey’s admission to the European Union. 
 
 
Le Monde: The ‘clash of civilizations’ is European 
 
It is hard to determine what Le Monde’s stance is towards 
the clash of civilizations. First, it should be stated that it is 
not particularly interested in reporting the speeches of the 
political leaders selected for this study, and this attitude is 
particularly noticeable in the case of Ahmadinejad and 
Abdullah Gül. On the other hand, as one might expect, 
Sarkozy’s words are analysed in the domestic context, 
without assessing their international repercussions. 
In its coverage of Bush’s speeches, it emphasizes the 
Iraq war and the country’s ongoing economic crisis. 
Regarding the war, Le Monde quotes directly expressions 
and arguments which belong to the frame of the “clash of  




civilizations”: Biblical references, and expressions with an 
apocalyptic tone, accompany Bush’s state-ments on 
“America’s mission in the world” and its moral obligation 
to defend values like freedom and democracy. 
None the less, the news articles about Bush’s 
speeches have a political focus. The rhetoric which Bush 
uses in this context is handled with chill scepticism. 
Although its critical vision coincides with that of The 
Guardian, Le Monde does not so much denounce the 
political interests behind the “war on terror” as its ideolo-
gical nature, comparing this conflict with the confrontation 
with commu-nism during the Cold War (“It was the 
speech of a man who knew how to prepare his country to 
face a challenge equivalent to the Cold War against 
communism”, 31/1/2002, Le Monde, ‘Bush en guerre’). 
Although the direct quotations in which Bush justifies and 
explains the Iraq war are reported faithfully, the frequent 
retorts to Bush’s assertions are noteworthy, as they 
establish a contrast with political analyses that differ from 
Bush’s position: thus, whereas Bush states that he has 
China and Russia on his side in the Iraq war (“Bush 
declares his satisfaction at having China and Russia on 
his side”), Le Monde emphasizes that these countries are 
the main suppliers of arms to the “axis of evil”: “America 
has to lead the world. This is imperative for its safety. The 
alternative to America’s leadership is a much more dan-
gerous world, a world full of fear”. 31/1/2002, Le Monde, 
‘Bush en guerre’). 
As far as the Iranian President’s speeches are con-
cerned, par-ticular attention is paid to his denial of the 
Holocaust and the anti-Zionism which this entails, which 
is interpreted as a consequence of the Islamic revolution 
of 1979. Le Monde considers Ahmadinejad’s position 
poses a risk to international security, but above all, threa-
tens a conflict generated by the confrontation between 
civilizations as a result of the different values and 
religious views that prevail in the Orient and in the West. 
In its coverage of Abdullah Gül’s speeches, and in 
accord with the position that seems to have become 
widespread in France, the danger of fundamentalism in 
Turkey is stressed, and the opposition to Gül within the 
country because he is in favour of introducing certain 
aspects of Sharia in civil legislation is emphasized. Le 
Monde alludes frequently to the threat posed by the new 
govern-ment to traditional Turkish laicism, and defends, 
directly or through declarations made by the Turkish 
opposition, the need for freedom and independence of 
thought, and for democracy. In a context in which the 
possible incorporation of Turkey in the European Union is 
being debated, the newspaper’s coverage warns of the 
risk of allowing a country that does not respect human 
rights to enter the EU, without referring specifically to the 
“clash of civilizations”. 
This vision is strengthened by the words of the French 
President himself.  Although, as we mentioned above, the 
main focus of his speeches is domestic, Le Monde re-
flects the importance which Sarkozy places on the values  




that define French culture. In Bercy, he stresses the 
values of the national culture, but adds a European 
dimension. He follows up on this, reinforcing the Euro-
pean angle, in his Strasbourg and Lateran speeches, 
where the newspaper reflects Sarkozy’s interpretation in 
no uncertain terms: France is the heart of Europe, and 
French values are European values. 
Although there is no explicit reference to the “clash of 
civilizations”, we can perceive an implicit intention to 
mark the limits that should define European culture with 
regard to other cultures. In his speech to the European 
Parliament, Sarkozy clearly alludes to the idea that it 
would be difficult for the European Union to allow Turkey 
to enter, and his ideas are evidently based on the notion  
that rejecting Turkey is not just a question of frontiers, but 
also a matter of cultural identity and values. 
In Lateran, this European identity acquires certain reli-
gious over-tones, in this case, involving Christianity. Le 
Monde gives broad coverage to this event, considering 
that Sarkozy’s acceptance of the honorary title given to 
him by the Vatican is a historic landmark. Although the 
newspaper seems not to be in favour of this rappro-
chement with the Church, and stresses France’s lay 
heritage, it does not hesitate to interpret this encounter 
using the frame of the “clash of civilizations”: Sarkozy is 
trying to strengthen the Christian roots as a means of 
demonstrating the cultural differences that separate 
Turkey from Europe.  (“If there is not a single word about 
Islam, he confirms the usefulness of the commission on 
the State-Catholic Church launched in 2002 by Lionel 
Jospin”, Le Monde, 22/12/2007). 
Whatever the case, the image of Sarkozy projected in 
Le Monde is that he accepts the view of the “clash of 
civilizations”, which is mainly reflected in the duty he has, 
as President of the European Union, to reinforce Eu-
rope’s cultural identity. However, in his rhetoric he avoids 
any allusion or direct confrontation with Islamic culture, 
placing a greater emphasis on defining European culture 




The equanimity of the Frankfürter: Another way of 
showing the ‘clash of civilizations’ 
 
The Frankfurter Allgemeine avoids sensationalism and 
mixing news with opinion. It has a serious style, and 
handles the political sources in a way that is correct and 
respectful, abstaining from comparisons and strong 
assertions. Instead, it conveys its opinion through subtle 
use of irony, or by contrasting different points of view. It 
generally allows all the parties involved to give their opi-
nion, showing the arguments put forward by all the 
different sides so that readers can draw their own con-
clusions. 
As far as the ‘clash of civilizations’ is concerned, this 
newspaper never mentions it as such. However, it is 





leaders who do make explicit use of the rhetoric that 
surrounds this concept. Thus the Frankfurter gives voice 
to the Iranian ayatollah Ali Chamenei, who asserts that 
“Bush is thirsting for blood” and that “Iran is proud to be 
hated by the greatest Satan in history” (‘Axis of evil’, 
1/12/2002). On the other hand, terms like “axis of evil” 
and “war on terror” are always given in inverted commas, 
quoted as something that someone else has said. 
Along similar lines, Frankfurter Allgemeine does not 
criticize Bush’s position, but rather confines itself to 
explaining his argu-ments and contrasting them with the 
declarations made by countries with opposing views. In 
2002, it explains the terms “axis of terror”, and “war on 
terrorism or/and war on terror” carefully, within the con-
text of the Iraq war and 9-11. In its coverage of the 2004 
speech, it is noticeable how it insists on giving the full 
arguments used by Bush to explain the decision to 
invade Iraq without the support of the UN, providing literal 
quotations from the President’s words, such as “Ame-
rica’s historic mission” and “America does not need to 
ask for anyone’s permission when it is a matter of secu-
rity” which were frequently used in his speeches around 
that time. 
Following Bush's own development, in 2006, this news-
paper provides the most extensive coverage of the North 
American economy and the problem of energy resources 
and, in 2008, it once again emphasizes the words that 
the President uses to justify the struggle against Al 
Qaeda, using terms like “ideological warfare of the 21st 
century”. 
Regarding Ahmadinejad, on 26 October 2005 
Frankfurter reports on his speech attacking Israel. In this 
article, his most aggressive expressions are quoted lite-
rally, such as “Anybody who recognizes Israel will burn in 
the fire of the Islamic nation's fury”. (‘Iran: Israel will dis-
appear’, 26/10/2005). Nevertheless, without compromis-
ing its neutrality, the newspaper systematically contrasts 
Ahmadinejad's declarations with those of the authorities 
of the countries to which he refers, and those of other 
leading figures who are opposed to his ideas.  While still 
following its policy of offering all the different points of 
view, this newspaper manages to temper statements that 
it takes to be disproportionate. 
As for Ahmadinejad's address at Columbia University, 
the report-ing focuses on the President of the University's 
initial refusal to allow him to speak. The newspaper does 
not hesitate to defend the President's academic freedom 
to choose who should speak on his campus and who 
should not. About the contents of his talk, the newspaper 
places emphasis on the students' participation and the 
controversy surrounding the issue of homosexuality, and 
scarcely makes reference to Ahmadinejad's words. It is 
significant that during the same period, this newspaper 
published a long report on what young Iranians think, 
showing the difference between this sector of the 
population and the President. This report concluded that 





The Frankfurter Allgemeine also provides a detailed 
description of Sarkozy's political aims, a profile of the 
ministers he chooses, and information about the mea-
sures he takes to quell the disturbances on the streets of 
Paris. In its coverage of Sarkozy's speeches, it takes a 
similar approach to that used with President Bush: for 
example, it gives an accurate explanation of the term 
‘positive laicism’ used by Sarkozy in his Lateran address, 
as well as of the meaning of the ceremony, and relations 
between France and the Vatican.  In the newspaper's 
interpretation of the term ‘laicism’, Sarkozy's position is 
described in relation to the clash of civilizations: 
Frankfürter Allgemeine identifies laicism with the values 
proper to the French State, concluding that Sarkozy is 
against a multicultural society in which religions can hold 
sway over the public sphere. In public affairs, the values 
of the French State must prevail, and these are essen-
tially lay values. This newspaper interpretes the adjective 
‘positive’ as meaning freedom of worship, but without 
allowing religious principles to condition laws or influence 
politics. 
The German newspaper also points out that Sarkozy is 
close to Angela Merkel in this, showing their agreement 
on the future of Europe, Turkey's entry into the European 
Union, and the way they face the challenges posed by 
the Islamic minorities in their countries. 
References to Abdullah Gül are scarce, but more fre-
quent mention is made of Prime Minister Erdogan. In 
both cases, they appear in news items about Turkey's 
entry into the European Union, a issue which Frankfürter 
covers as if it were a matter of national rather than inter-
national politics. The attitudes of the German and Turkish 
governments are explicit: Turkey is applying for entry, 
and German refuses to accept integration, even though it 
is willing to grant preferential treatment. 
The debate is clearly framed as a matter of cultural 
difference, although Erdogan's argument that the Euro-
pean Union would lose power if it did not include Turkey 
is also reported: “If the European Union wants to be a 
world power and avoid a clash of cultures, it ought to opt 
for an alliance of civilizations and not leave Turkey out-
side” (‘A feast day for chauvinists’, 4/10/2005). According 
to this newspaper, by saying this, the Turkish leader is 
telling us that a refusal to admit Turkey is evidence of an 
attitude that is contrary to dialogue, and which will lead to 
cultural confrontation. The published declarations of both 
Gül and Erdogan use the same words as Merkel and 
Sarkozy: ‘laicism’ and ‘integration’. But the newspaper 
points out that for Erdogan, ‘lay’ means that the State 
should keep the same distance from Christians and 
Muslims alike, and emphasizes that in his view, the Turks 
in Germany are undergoing a process of  “assimilation” 
rather than “integration”, because they are obliged to 
adopt the German language and culture. The newspaper 
also reports on the attitude of the most conservative 
Turkish association in Germany, which seeks to promote 
Turkish identity and demands that the government should 
create bilingual (Turkish-German) schools. 




In spite of these declarations, the newspaper reports at 
length on Angela Merkel's views, which are clearly oppo-
sed to Turkey's entry. Alongside the words of the leading 
politicians in both countries, Frankfürter Allgemeine also 
reflects a wide variety of opinions from citizens' associa-






The aim of the present study is, as we stated at the out-
set, to review the foci, symbols and interpretations that 
the world media use to reflect and spread the political 
message concerning the “clash of civilizations”. Our pur-
pose is to observe how this cultural conflict is expressed 
in the political discourse, and how this is then reflected in 
the major world media. In short, in what form is the notion 
of the “clash of civilizations” being presented in the public 
debate? How is it defined or described? What conflicts 
are brought into association with this expression? How 
media reflect or frame political discourse? 
Firstly, we could conclude that the frame of the “clash 
of civilizations” is perceived more clearly in the political 
discourse than in the media. 
Politicians interpret, or frame, the concept of a “clash of 
civilizations” in accord with their own interests. Thus Bush 
distances himself from the schema of a confrontation 
between civilizations in order to establish another inter-
pretation: he is fighting a war on “those who spread 
terror”, and not against Islamic civilization. The clash is 
happening for reasons of security, and it is not a cultural 
battle. In the case of Iran, political interpretations also 
take precedence over cultural ones: the cause of the con-
flict is the US aggression in the Middle East and its action 
through its “bridgehead”, that is, Israel. Abdullah Gül and 
Erdogan acknowledge the existence of a tension bet-
ween cultures, but minimize the possibility of a “clash”, 
and they back the chances of an understanding. They 
stress the need to integrate Turkey in the European 
Union. Sarkozy’s stance is somewhat paradoxical. On the 
one hand, he does not hesitate to preach “positive 
laicism” in which all religions have to be able to live side 
by side, as a way of resolving the problems of multicultu-
ralism in his own country. On the other hand, he sees 
Europe as a “fortress” with a definite cultural identity, with 
some values currently in crisis, which has to be consoli-
dated and defended from outside forces. This is why he 
is so radically opposed to Turkey’s entry to the European 
Union, and to the increase in the number of immigrants. 
In spite of the differences, we could also conclude that 
political leaders use similar frames with different 
(opposing) meanings. There is a certain overlap in the 
values which all of these leaders express. Specifically, 
there is a striking parallelism between the terms used by 
Bush and Ahmadinejad in their speeches (Table 1).  
This situation reflects a certain similarity in the cultural 
frame through which the “clash of civilizations” is under-
stood. 




Table 1. Political frames amongst politician. 
 
GEORGE W. BUSH “Enemies of freedom” “Evil regime” “Tasks of history” “War on terror” 




Regarding the newspapers analysed, we can say that 
in all three cases, the interpretive frame set by the edito-
rial line prevails over that used in the political discourse. 
In accord with this, the newspapers studied here strive to 
attribute the expressions and rhetoric associated with the 
“clash of civilizations” to the declarations made by the 
political leaders in question. 
However, we must also stress the way the focus alters 
in all three European newspapers when there is a change 
in the scenario in which the hypothetical “clash of civili-
zations” is supposedly being played out. 
In the world context, the frame of the “clash of civiliza-
tions” would seem not to form part of the way news-
papers perceive the state of affairs. The speeches of 
Bush and Ahmadinejad are handled with a certain scep-
ticism, and the political interests that underlie both their 
points of view are emphasized, accompanied by explana-
tions of the controversy in the light of the newspaper’s 
own stance towards the international order: The Guardian 
has an attitude that is clearly critical, coloured by its own 
multipolar view of world politics; Le Monde takes a neu-
tral stance, preferring to give a historial interpretation of 
events; and the Frankfürter Allgemeine maintains its cha-
racteristic equanimity, while clearly providing evidence of 
the disproportional nature of Ahmadinejad’s discourses 
and questioning his status as an international authority. 
In the European context, however, the newspapers are 
more willing to become involved and adopt a frame of 
cultural interpretation. They agree in emphasizing the 
differences between Europe (France and Germany, in 
this case) and Turkey. The Guardian defends Turkey’s 
EU entry, and even refers explicitly to the threat posed by 
a possible clash if Turkey is rejected. Although The Guar-
dian is talking about a political clash rather than a cultural 
one, it is not afraid to use expressions from the ambit of 
the “clash of civilizations” to defend its stance. Le Monde, 
questions whether Turkey’s entry would be opportune, 
and makes no bones about falling back on the framework 
of cultural interpretation to express the differ-rence 
between European laicism and the growing fundamenta-
lism in Turkey. It is in this key that it interprets the Presi-
dent’s declarations, reporting his views on this at some 
length. The Frankfürter Allgemeine maintains a balanced 
position, but does not abstain from alluding to the cultural 
problem posed by the Turkish minority in Germany, or 
pointing out the general agreement between Sarkozy and 
Merkel on this issue. 
We may therefore conclude that the political frame 
which has the greatest chance of prospering and being 
assimilated by the media is that  which  makes  reference 
to internal politics. In this context, it is noteworthy that 
national interests prevail over cultural issues. 
Finally, exclusively on the basis of the results of this 
study, we can conclude that the process by which a parti-
cular frame is created on a matter of a symbolic nature, 
like the clash of civilizations, would seem to reflect the 
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